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Abstract 
 Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in general, comprehensive models of 
human cognition. Such models aim to explain higher order cognitive faculties, such as 
deliberation and planning. Given a computational representation, the validity of these models can 
be tested in computer simulations such as software agents or embodied robots. The push to 
implement computational models of this kind has created the field of Artificial General 
Intelligence, or AGI.  
 Moral decision making is arguably one of the most challenging tasks for computational 
approaches to higher order cognition. The need for increasingly autonomous artificial agents to 
factor moral considerations into their choices and actions has given rise to another new field of 
inquiry variously known as Machine Morality, Machine Ethics, Roboethics or Friendly AI. In 
this paper we discuss how LIDA, an AGI model of human cognition, can be adapted to model 
both affective and rational features of moral decision making. Using the LIDA model we will 
demonstrate how moral decisions can be made in many domains using the same mechanisms that 
enable general decision making.  
 Comprehensive models of human cognition typically aim for compatibility with recent 
research in the cognitive and neural sciences. Global Workspace Theory (GWT), proposed by 
the neuropsychologist Bernard Baars (1988), is a highly regarded model of human cognition that 
is currently being computationally instantiated in several software implementations. LIDA 
(Franklin et al. 2005) is one such computational implementation. LIDA is both a set of 
computational tools and an underlying model of human cognition, which provides mechanisms 
that are capable of explaining how an agent’s selection of its next action arises from bottom-up 
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collection of sensory data and top-down processes for making sense of its current situation. We 
will describe how the LIDA model helps integrate emotions into the human decision making 
process, and elucidate a process whereby an agent can work through an ethical problem to reach 
a solution that takes account of ethically relevant factors.  
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Introduction  
 
Artificial general intelligence and moral machines 
 
Human-level intelligence entails the capacity to handle a broad array of challenges 
including logical reasoning, understanding the semantic content of language, learning, navigating 
around the obstacles in a room, discerning the intent of other agents, and planning and decision 
making in situations where information is incomplete. The prospect of building “thinking 
machines” with the general intelligence to tackle such an array of tasks inspired the early 
founders of the field of Artificial Intelligence. However, they soon discovered that tasks such as 
reasoning about physical objects or processing natural language, where they expected to make 
rapid progress, posed daunting technological problems. Thus the developers of AI systems have 
been forced to focus on the design of systems with the ability to intelligently manage specific 
tasks within relatively narrow domains, such as playing chess or buying and selling currencies on 
international markets. Despite the fact that many tasks such as visual processing, speech 
processing, and semantic understanding present thresholds that have yet to be crossed by 
technology, there has been in recent years a transition back to the development of systems with 
more general intelligence. Such systems are broadly referred to as having artificial general 
intelligence (AGI) (Wang, Goertzel & Franklin, 2008). 
The possibility of building AI systems with moral decision making faculties has stepped 
beyond the stories of science fiction writers such as Isaac Asimov and is being seriously 
considered by philosophers and engineers (Gips, 1991; Clarke, 1993, 1994; Allen, Varner & 
A Conceptual and Computational Model of Moral Decision Making in Human and Artificial 
Agents 
 
 5 
Zinser, 2000). A new field of enquiry called Machine Ethics (Anderson & Anderson, 2006), 
Machine Morality (Wallach, Allen & Smit, 2008), Artificial Morality (Danielson, 1992), or 
Computational Ethics (Allen, 2002) is emerging.  
This interest in building computer systems capable of making moral decisions (“moral 
machines”) has been spurred by the need to ensure that increasingly autonomous computer 
systems and robots do not cause harm to humans and other agents worthy of moral consideration 
(Wallach & Allen, 2009). Though the goals of this new research endeavor are more practical 
than theoretical, an interest in testing whether consequentialist, deontological, and virtue-based 
theories of ethics can be implemented computationally has also attracted philosophers and social 
scientists to this new field. Most of the research to date is directed at either the safety of 
computers that function within very limited domains or at systems that serve as advisors to 
human decision makers. 
 AGI and Machine Morality have emerged as distinct fields of inquiry. The intersection 
between their agendas has been minimal, and primarily focused on Friendly AI (Yudkowsky, 
2001), the concern that future super-intelligent machines be friendly to humans. But let us be 
clear at the outset. No AGI systems have been completed. Nor do any computer systems exist 
that are capable of making sophisticated moral decisions. However, some computer scientists 
believe such systems can be built relatively soon. Ben Goertzel estimates that, with adequate 
funding, scientists could complete an AGI within ten years (personal communication 2009). 
Certainly sophisticated moral machines will require at least a minimal AGI architecture.  
So, if demonstrated success in either of these pursuits is so far in the future, what do we 
expect to achieve in this paper? Our goals are twofold: 
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1. To outline a comprehensive approach to moral decision making. Philosophers and 
cognitive scientists have stressed the importance of particular cognitive mechanisms, for 
example, reasoning, moral sentiments, heuristics, intuitions, or a moral grammar in the 
making of moral decisions. But there has been very little work on thinking 
comprehensively about the broad array of cognitive faculties necessary for moral 
decision making. In analyzing how a moral machine might be built from the ground up, it 
becomes apparent that many cognitive mechanisms must be enlisted to produce 
judgments sensitive to the considerations humans accommodate when they respond to 
morally charged situations (Wallach & Allen, 2009).  
2. To demonstrate that many moral decisions can be made using the same cognitive 
mechanisms that are used for general decision making. In other words, moral cognition is 
supported by domain general cognitive processes. Certainly some kinds of moral 
decisions may require additional mechanisms, or may require that the kinds of 
mechanisms described in this paper be modified to handle features peculiar to moral 
considerations. Elucidation of such mechanisms and their probable design is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
In proposing a comprehensive model for moral decision making, we are fully aware that 
other scholars will criticize this model as being inadequate. For example, neuroscientists might 
argue that a modular system such as LIDA does not capture the full complexity of the human 
neural architecture. Moral philosophers might contend that the agent we will describe is not 
really engaged in moral reflection because it lacks Kantian ‘autonomy’ or ‘will.’ The computer 
scientist Drew McDermott (forthcoming) asserts that appreciating the tension between self-
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interest and the needs of others is essential for moral decisions and will be extremely difficult to 
build into computational agents. There are many criticisms that can be made of AGI models, and 
many arguments as to why computational agents are not capable of ‘true’ moral reflection.  
Nevertheless, we feel it is important to recognize that moral judgment and behavior are 
not the products of one or two dedicated mechanisms. Nor do we feel it is helpful to merely 
underscore the complexity of moral decision making. Therefore, we offer this model in hopes of 
stimulating a deeper appreciation of the many cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the 
making of moral decisions, and to provide some insight into how these mechanisms might work 
together. 
 
Computation models of human cognitive faculties 
 
A central fascination with AI research has been the opportunity it offers to test 
computational theories of human cognitive faculties. AGI does not require that the computational 
system emulate the mechanisms of human cognition in order to achieve a comparable level of 
performance. However, human cognition is the only model we currently have for general 
intelligence or moral decision making (although some animals demonstrate higher order 
cognitive faculties and pro-social behavior). The cognitive and brain sciences are bringing forth a 
wealth of empirical data about the design of the human nervous system, and about human mental 
faculties. This research suggests a host of new theories for specific cognitive processes that can, 
at least in principle, be tested computationally.  
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Despite significant gaps in scientific understanding it is feasible to design systems that try 
to emulate the current best understanding of human faculties, even if those systems do not 
perform exactly as the brain functions. Computational models of human cognition are built by 
computer scientists who wish to instantiate human-level faculties in AI, and by cognitive 
scientists and neuroscientists formulating testable hypotheses compatible with empirical data 
from studies of the nervous system, and mental and behavioral activity.  
Both as a set of computational tools and an underlying model of human cognition, LIDA 
is one attempt to computationally instantiate Baars’ Global Workspace Theory (GWT). Such a 
computational instantiation of GWT, which attempts to accommodate the psychological and 
neuroscientific evidence, will be particularly helpful in thinking through an array of challenges 
with a high degree of specificity. In this paper, we will explore how the LIDA model of GWT 
can be expected to implement a higher order cognitive task, specifically the kind of decision 
making involved in the resolution of a moral dilemma. 
Given that computational approaches to moral decision making, GWT, and the LIDA 
model are subjects that may not be familiar to all readers, the initial sections of this paper 
provide brief overviews of these topics. The next section of the paper introduces several 
approaches to computerizing ethics, GWT, and LIDA. The following section provides a 
description of the LIDA model, and various theories and research that support this approach to 
human cognition. A discussion of the manner in which the LIDA model might be used to make 
moral decisions and some concluding comments follow. 
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Machine morality, GWT, and LIDA 
 
Ethical decision making and AI 
 
Ethical decisions are among the more complex that agents face. Ethical decision making 
can be understood as action selection under conditions where constraints, principles, values, and 
social norms play a central role in determining which behavioral attitudes and responses are 
acceptable. Many ethical decisions require having to select an action when information is 
unclear, incomplete, confusing, and even false, where the possible results of an action cannot be 
predicted with any significant degree of certainty, and where conflicting values can inform the 
decision-making process. 
Commonly, ethics is understood as focusing on the most intractable of social and 
personal challenges. Debate often centers on how to prioritize duties, rules, or principles when 
they conflict. But ethical factors influence a much broader array of decisions than those we 
deliberate as individuals or as a community. Values and ideals are instantiated in habits, 
normative behavior, feelings, and attitudes. Ethical behavior includes not only the choices we 
deliberate, but also the rapid choices that substantiate values—choices that might be modeled in 
LIDA as single-cycle, consciously mediated responses to challenges. Given this broad definition 
of ethical decisions, values play an implicit role, and sometimes an explicit role, in the selection 
of a broad array of actions.  
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Following Sloman (1999), we note that moral behavior can be reflexive, or the result of 
deliberation, and at least for humans, also includes metacognition1 when criteria used to make 
ethical decisions are periodically reevaluated. Successful responses to challenges reinforce the 
selected behaviors, while unsuccessful outcomes have an inhibitory influence, and may initiate a 
reinspection of one’s actions and behavior selection. Thus, a computational model of moral 
decision making will need to describe a method for implementing reflexive value laden 
responses, while also explaining how these responses can be reinforced, or inhibited through 
learning, top-down deliberative reasoning, and metacognition.  
It is helpful, although somewhat simplistic, to think of implementing moral decision-
making faculties in AI systems in terms of two approaches: top-down and bottom-up (Allen et 
al., 2000; Allen et al., 2006; Wallach et al., 2008; Wallach & Allen, 2009). A top-down approach 
entails the implementation of rules or a moral theory, such as the Ten Commandments, Kant’s 
categorical imperative, Mill’s utilitarianism, or even Asimov’s laws. Generally, top-down 
theories are deliberative and even metacognitive, although individual duties may be implemented 
reactively. A top-down approach takes an antecedently specified ethical theory and analyzes its 
computational requirements to guide the design of algorithms and subsystems capable of 
implementing the theory. 
A number of scholars have considered the challenges entailed in computational 
implementation of individual top-down theories of ethics, including Asimov’s laws (Clarke, 
1993, 1994), Kant’s categorical imperative (Allen et al., 2000; Stahl, 2002; Powers, 2006), 
                                            
1 Sloman speaks of meta-management rather than metacognition. We prefer the more common 
psychological term. 
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Ross’s prima facie duties (Anderson, Anderson & Armen, 2005, 2006), deontic logic 
(Bringsjord, Arkoudas & Bello, 2006), utilitarianism (Allen et al., 2000; Grau, 2006), and virtues 
(DeMoss, 1998). Implementing each of these theories poses specific difficulties for designers 
and programmers. Each is susceptible to some version of the frame problem—computational 
load due to the need for knowledge of human psychology, knowledge of the affects of actions in 
the world, and the difficulty in estimating the sufficiency of initial information. 
Bottom-up approaches, if they use a prior theory at all, do so only as a way of specifying 
the task for the system, but not as a way of specifying an implementation method or control 
structure. A bottom-up approach aims at goals or standards that may or may not be specified in 
explicit theoretical terms. Evolution, development, and learning provide models for designing 
systems from the bottom up. Alife (artificial life) experiments within computer environments, 
evolutionary and behavior-based robots, and genetic algorithms all provide mechanisms for 
building sophisticated computational agents from the bottom up. Bottom-up strategies influenced 
by theories of development are largely dependent on the learning capabilities of artificial agents. 
However, the bottom-up development of moral agents is limited given present day technologies, 
but breakthroughs in computer learning or Alife, for example, might well enhance the usefulness 
of these platforms for developing artificial moral agents (Wallach & Allen, 2009). 
Furthermore, even agents who adhere to a deontological ethic or are utilitarians may 
require emotional intelligence as well as other “supra-rational” faculties (Wallach & Allen, 
2009). A sense of self, a theory of mind (ToM), an appreciation for the semantic content of 
information, and functional (if not phenomenal) consciousness (Franklin, 2003) are probably 
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also prerequisites for full moral agency. A complete model of moral cognition will need to 
explain how such faculties are represented in the system.  
Work has begun on the development of artificial mechanisms that complement a system’s 
rational faculties, such as affective skills (Picard, 1997), sociability (Breazeal, 2002), embodied 
cognition (Brooks, 2002; Glenberg, 1997), theory of mind (Scassellati, 2001), and consciousness 
(Holland, 2003), but these projects are not specifically directed at designing systems with moral 
decision-making faculties. Eventually there will be a need for hybrid systems that maintain the 
dynamic and flexible morality of bottom-up systems, which accommodate diverse inputs, while 
subjecting the evaluation of choices and actions to top-down principles that represent ideals we 
strive to meet. Depending on the environments in which these artificial moral agents (AMAs) 
operate, they will also require some additional supra-rational faculties. Such systems must also 
specify just how the bottom-up and top-down processes interact. 
To date, the experimental systems that implement some sensitivity to moral 
considerations (McLaren, 2006; Anderson et al., 2006; Guarini, 2006) are rudimentary, and 
cannot accommodate the complexity of human decision making. Scaling any approach to handle 
more and more difficult challenges will, in all likelihood, require additional mechanisms.  
 
Global workspace theory 
 
Global workspace theory (GWT) (Baars, 1988) was originally conceived as a 
neuropsychological model of consciousness, but has come to be widely recognized as a high-
level theory of human cognitive processing, which is well supported by empirical studies (Baars, 
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2002). GWT views the nervous system as a distributed parallel system with many different 
specialized processes. Some coalitions of these processes enable the agent to make sense of the 
sensory data coming from the current environmental situation. Other coalitions incorporating the 
results of the processing of sensory data compete for attention. The winner occupies what Baars 
calls a global workspace, whose contents are broadcast to all other processes. These contents of 
the global workspace are presumed to be conscious, at least from a functional perspective. This 
conscious broadcast serves to recruit other processes to be used to select an action to deal with 
the current situation. GWT is a theory of how consciousness functions within cognition. 
Unconscious contexts influence this competition for consciousness. In GWT, and in its LIDA 
model, learning requires and follows from attention, and occurs with each conscious broadcast. 
Given that GWT is a leading model of human cognition and consciousness, it is valuable 
to explore whether a computational model of GWT can accommodate higher order mental 
processes. Three different research teams, lead by Stanislas Dehaene, Murray Shanahan, and 
Stan Franklin, have developed models for instantiating aspects of GWT computationally. In this 
paper we focus on the LIDA model developed by Franklin and his team. In doing so, we do not 
mean to suggest that LIDA, or for that matter computational models of cognition based on GWT, 
is the only AGI model capable of modeling human-level decision making. We merely consider 
LIDA to be a particularly comprehensive model and one that includes features similar to those 
built into other AGI systems.  
The LIDA model describes how an agent tries to make sense of its environment and 
decides what to do next. An action is selected in every LIDA cognitive cycle (see below), of 
which there may be five to ten in every second. More complex decisions require deliberation 
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over many such cycles. The challenge for a model of cognition such as LIDA is whether it can 
truly describe complex higher-order decision making in terms of sequences of bottom-up, single-
cycle action selection.  
 
LIDA and moral decision making 
 
LIDA is a model of human cognition, inspired by findings in cognitive science and 
neuroscience, that is able to accommodate the messiness and complexity of a hybrid approach to 
decision making. Our task here is not to substantiate one formal approach to ethics in LIDA. 
Rather, we will describe how various influences, such as feelings, rules, and virtues, on ethical 
decisions might be represented within the mechanisms of the LIDA model. The resulting agent 
may not be a perfect utilitarian or deontologist, and it may not live up to ethical ideals. A LIDA-
based artificial moral agent (AMA) is intended to be a practical solution to a practical problem: 
how to take into account as much ethically relevant information as possible in the time available 
to select an action. 
Our discussion of moral decision making in LIDA will focus on six areas, most involving 
several questions.  
1. Where are bottom-up propensities and values implemented? How does the agent learn 
new values and propensities, as well as reinforce or defuse existing values and 
propensities? 
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2. How are rules or duties represented in the LIDA model? What activates a rule and brings 
it to conscious attention? How might some rules be automatized to form unconscious 
rules-of-thumb (heuristics)? 
3. How does the LIDA model transition from a single cycle to the determination that 
information in consciousness needs to be deliberated upon?  
4. What determines the end of a deliberation?  
5. How can we implement planning or imagination (the testing out of different scenarios) in 
LIDA? 
6. When a resolution to the challenge has been determined, how might the LIDA model 
monitor whether that resolution is successful? How might LIDA use this monitoring for 
further learning? 
In the section that follows we describe the LIDA model, its architecture, its antecedents, 
its relationship to other cognitive architectures, its decision making, and its learning processes. 
After that we return to discussing how the LIDA model might be used for moral decision 
making. In particular, we offer hypotheses for how the LIDA model answers each of the 
questions raised in the six issues listed above. Through this exercise we hope to demonstrate the 
usefulness of a computational model of GWT, and how a computer system might be developed 
for handling the complexity of human-level decision making and in particular moral decision 
making. Whether a fully functioning LIDA would be judged to demonstrate the moral acumen 
necessary for moral agency is, however, impossible to determine without actually building and 
testing the system. 
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LIDA 
 
The LIDA model and its architecture 
 
The LIDA model is a comprehensive, conceptual, and computational2 model covering a 
large portion of human cognition. In addition to GWT, the model implements and fleshes out a 
number of psychological and neuropsychological theories including situated cognition (Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch, 1991), perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999), working memory 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), memory by affordances3 (Glenberg, 1997), long-term working 
memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), event segmentation theory (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver 
& Reynolds, 2007), and Sloman’s H-CogAff (1999). The comprehensive LIDA model includes a 
broad array of cognitive modules and processes, a database of which, including known possible 
neural correlates, can be found online at http://ccrg.cs.memphis.edu/tutorial/correlates.html. 
LIDA is an extension of IDA, an implemented and running software agent that finds new 
billets for U.S. sailors at the end of their current tour of duty (Franklin, Kelemen, & McCauley, 
1998; Franklin & McCauley, 2003). Parts of LIDA are implemented and running. Others are 
                                            
2 Although the LIDA model is only partially implemented, we claim it as a computational model 
because each of its modules and most of its processes have been designed for implementation. 
3 Gibson (1979) introduced the term affordance, meaning that information about the available 
uses of an object existed in the object itself. We are using it in the sense that the agent can derive 
such information from the object. 
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designed and waiting their turn at implementation. One cannot simply implement LIDA once and 
for all. Each distinct implementation of the LIDA architecture as a software agent or a robot 
must be accomplished within a given domain with its own domain and task-specific sensors, 
effectors, and motivations. No single LIDA implementation can control different software agents 
or robots, as each such control structure must be adapted to operate with its own distinct sensors, 
effectors, and motivations. Franklin’s research group is currently actively engaged in producing a 
computational framework for the LIDA architecture that will serve to underlie and facilitate such 
implementations. But, LIDA is also a work in progress. The conceptual LIDA model is being 
added to, most recently by the addition of Zacks’ event segmentation theory (Zacks et al., 2007).  
LIDA is a general cognitive architecture that can encompass moral decision making. A 
full account of the stream of processes by which it does so appears for the first time in this paper. 
Earlier papers have described various portions of the model and its architecture in some detail 
(Franklin & Patterson, 2006; Franklin & Ramamurthy, 2006; Franklin et al., 2007; Friedlander & 
Franklin, 2008; Negatu, D’Mello & Franklin, 2007; Ramamurthy, Baars, D’Mello & Franklin, 
2006). However, none has spelled out the entire, multifaceted, decision-making process a la 
LIDA. While its developers hesitate to claim that LIDA is more general or more powerful than 
other comprehensive cognitive architectures such as SOAR (Laird, Newell & Rosenbloom, 
1987), ACT-R (Anderson, 1990), Clarion (Sun, 2007), etc., they do believe that LIDA will prove 
to be both a more detailed and more faithful model of human cognition, including several forms 
of learning, that incorporates the processes and mechanisms required for moral decision making.  
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The LIDA cognitive cycle 
 
The LIDA model and its ensuing architecture are grounded in the LIDA cognitive cycle. 
Every autonomous agent (Franklin & Graesser, 1997), human, animal, or artificial, must 
frequently sample (sense) its environment and select an appropriate response (action). 
Sophisticated agents such as humans process (make sense of) the input from such sampling in 
order to facilitate their decision making. Neuroscientists call this three-part process the action-
perception cycle. The agent’s “life” can be viewed as consisting of a continual sequence of these 
cognitive cycles. Each cycle consists of a unit of sensing, of attending, and of acting. A cognitive 
cycle can be thought of as a cognitive “moment.” Higher-level cognitive processes are composed 
of many of these cognitive cycles, each a cognitive “atom.”  
Just as atoms have inner structure, the LIDA model hypothesizes a rich inner structure for 
its cognitive cycles (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Franklin, Baars, Ramamurthy & Ventura, 2005). 
During each cognitive cycle the LIDA agent first makes sense of (see below) its current situation 
as best as it can by updating its representation of both external and internal features of its world. 
By a competitive process to be described below, it then decides what portion of the represented 
situation is most in need of attention. This portion is broadcast, making it the current contents of 
consciousness, and enabling the agent to choose an appropriate action and execute it.  
Fig. 1 shows the process in more detail. It starts in the upper left corner and proceeds 
roughly clockwise. 
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The cycle begins with sensory stimuli from external and internal sources in the agent’s 
environment. Low-level feature detectors in sensory memory begin the process of making sense 
of the incoming stimuli. These low-level features are passed on to perceptual memory where 
higher-level features such as objects, categories, relations, situations, etc. are recognized. These 
entities, which have been recognized preconsciously, make up the percept that passed to the 
workspace, where a model of the agent’s current situation is assembled. This percept serves as a 
cue to two forms of episodic memory, transient and declarative. Responses to the cue consist of 
local associations, that is, remembered events from these two memory systems that were 
associated with the various elements of the cue. In addition to the current percept, the workspace 
contains recent percepts and the models assembled from them that have not yet decayed away.  
A new model of the agent’s current situation is assembled from the percepts, the 
associations, and the undecayed parts of the previous model. This assembly process will 
typically be carried out by structure-building codelets.4 These structure-building codelets are 
small, special purpose processors, each of which has some particular type of structure it is 
designed to build. To fulfill their task these codelets may draw upon perceptual memory and 
even sensory memory, to enable the recognition of relations and situations. The newly assembled 
model constitutes the agent’s understanding of its current situation within its world. It has made 
sense of the incoming stimuli. 
                                            
4 The term codelet refers generally to any small, special purpose processor or running piece of 
computer code. The concept is essentially the same as Baars’ processors (1988), Minsky’s agents 
(1985), Jackson’s demons (1987), or Ornstein's small minds (1986). The term was borrowed 
from Hofstadter and Mitchell (1995). 
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For an agent operating within a complex, dynamically changing environment, this current 
model may well be too much for the agent to consider all at once in deciding what to do next. It 
needs to selectively attend to a portion of the model. Portions of the model compete for attention. 
These competing portions take the form of coalitions of structures from the model. Such 
coalitions are formed by attention codelets, whose function is to bring certain structures to 
consciousness. One of the coalitions wins the competition. In effect, the agent has decided on 
what to attend. 
The purpose of this processing is to help the agent decide what to do next. To this end, a 
representation of the contents of the winning coalition is broadcast globally, constituting a global 
workspace (hence the name global workspace theory). Though the contents of this conscious 
broadcast are available globally, the primary recipient is procedural memory, which stores 
templates of possible actions including their contexts and possible results. It also stores an 
activation value for each such template that attempts to measure the likelihood of an action taken 
within its context producing the expected result. Templates whose contexts intersect sufficiently 
with the contents of the conscious broadcast instantiate copies of themselves with their variables 
specified to the current situation. Instantiated templates remaining from previous cycles may also 
continue to be available. These instantiations are passed to the action selection mechanism, 
which chooses a single action from one of these instantiations. The chosen action then goes to 
sensory-motor memory, where it is executed by an appropriate algorithm. The action taken 
affects the environment, external or internal, and the cycle is complete.  
The LIDA model hypothesizes that all human cognitive processing is via a continuing 
iteration of such cognitive cycles. These cycles occur asynchronously, with each cognitive cycle 
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taking roughly 300 ms. The cycles cascade; that is, several cycles may have different processes 
running simultaneously in parallel. This cascading must, however, respect the serial nature of 
conscious processing necessary to maintain the stable, coherent image of the world it provides 
(Merker, 2005; Franklin, 2005b). Together with the asynchrony, the cascading allows a rate of 
cycling in humans of five to ten cycles per second. A cognitive “moment” is thus quite short! 
There is considerable empirical evidence from neuroscience suggestive of and consistent with 
such cognitive cycling in humans (Massimini, Ferrarelli, Huber, Esser, Singh & Tononi, 2005; 
Sigman & Dehaene, 2006; Uchida, Kepecs & Mainen, 2006; Willis & Todorov, 2006). None of 
this evidence is conclusive, however. 
 
Learning in the LIDA model 
 
Edelman (1987) usefully distinguishes two forms of learning, the selectionist and the 
instructionalist. Selectionist learning requires selection from a redundant repertoire that is 
typically organized by some form of reinforcement learning. A repertoire of actions is redundant 
if slightly different actions can lead to roughly the same result. In reinforcement learning 
(Kaelbling, Littman & Moore, 1996) a successfully executed action belonging to an existing 
repertoire is reinforced, making it more likely to be chosen the next time the result in question is 
needed. In Edelman’s system little-used actions tend to decay away. Instructional learning, in 
contrast, allows the learning of representations of new actions that are not currently in the 
repertoire.  
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Global workspace theory postulates that learning requires only attention (Baars, 1988, pp. 
213–218). In the LIDA model this implies that learning must occur with each cognitive cycle, 
because whatever enters consciousness is being attended to. More specifically, learning occurs 
with the conscious broadcast from the global workspace during each cycle. Learning in the 
LIDA model follows the tried and true AI principle of generate and test. New representations are 
learned in a profligate manner (the generation) during each cognitive cycle. Those that are not 
sufficiently reinforced during subsequent cycles (the test) decay away. Three modes of 
learning—perceptual, episodic, and procedural—employing distinct mechanisms (Nadel, 1992; 
Franklin et al., 2005) have been designed and are in various stages of implementation. A fourth, 
attentional learning, is contemplated but not yet designed. We discuss each individually. 
Perceptual learning enables an agent to recognize features, objects, categories, relations, 
and situations. In the LIDA model what is learned perceptually is stored in perceptual memory 
(Franklin, 2005a, 2005c). Motivated by the Slipnet from the Copycat architecture (Hofstadter & 
Mitchell, 1995), the LIDA perceptual memory is implemented as a collection of nodes and links 
with activation passing between the nodes. Nodes represent features, individuals, categories, 
actions, feelings, and more complex structures. Links, both excitatory and inhibitory, represent 
relations. Each node and link has both a current and a base-level activation. The base-level 
activation measures how useful the node or link has been in the past, while the current activation 
depends on its relevance in the current situation. The percept passed on to the workspace during 
each cognitive cycle is composed of those nodes and links whose total activation is over the 
threshold. Perceptual learning in its selectionist form modifies base-level activation, and in its 
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instructionalist form creates new nodes and links. One, the other, or both may occur with the 
conscious broadcast during each cognitive cycle. 
Episodic learning refers to the memory of events—the what, the where, and the when 
(Tulving, 1983; Baddeley, Conway & Aggleton, 2001). In the LIDA model such learned events 
are stored in transient episodic memory (Conway, 2002; Franklin et al., 2005) and in the longer-
term declarative memory (Franklin et al., 2005). Both are implemented using sparse distributed 
memory (Kanerva, 1988), which is both associative and content addressable, and has other 
characteristics that correspond to psychological properties of memory. In particular it knows 
when it doesn’t know, and exhibits the tip of the tongue phenomenon. Episodic learning in the 
LIDA model (Ramamurthy, D’Mello & Franklin, 2004, 2005) is also a matter of generate and 
test, with such learning occurring at the conscious broadcast of each cognitive cycle. Episodic 
learning is initially directed only to transient episodic memory. At a later time and offline, the 
undecayed contents of transient episodic memory are consolidated (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; 
Stickgold & Walker, 2005) into declarative memory, where they still may decay away or may 
last a lifetime.  
Procedural learning refers to the learning of new tasks and the improvement of old tasks. 
In the LIDA model such learning is accomplished in procedural memory (D’Mello, 
Ramamurthy, Negatu & Franklin, 2006), which is implemented via a scheme net motivated by 
Drescher’s schema mechanism (1991). Each scheme in procedural memory is a template for an 
action, consisting of a context, an action, and a result, together with a base-level activation 
intended to measure how likely the result would be to occur were the action taken within its 
specific context. Once again, the LIDA model’s procedural learning is via a generate and test 
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mechanism, using base-level activation as reinforcement, as well as through the creation of new 
schemes. These new schemes can support multiple actions, both parallel and sequential. 
Attentional learning, that is, the learning of what to attend to (Estes, 1993; Vidnyánszky 
& Sohn, 2003), has been relatively little studied by neuroscientists or cognitive scientists (but see 
Kruschke, 2003; Yoshida & Smith, 2003). 
To our knowledge it has been totally ignored by AI researchers, no doubt because few of 
their systems contain mechanisms for both attention and learning. In the LIDA model attentional 
learning would involve attention codelets, small processes whose job it is to focus the agent’s 
attention on some particular portion of its internal model of the current situation. When designed, 
we envision the LIDA model’s attentional learning mechanism involving modulating the base-
level activation of attention codelets, as well as the creation of new ones.  
 
Feelings and emotions in the LIDA model 
 
The word “feeling” may be associated with external haptic sense, such as the feeling in 
fingertips as they touch the keys while typing. It is also used in connection with internal senses, 
such as the feeling of thirst, of fear of a truck bearing down, of the pain of a pinprick, of pressure 
from a full bladder, of shame at having behaved ungraciously, and so on. Here, we are concerned 
with feelings arising from internal senses.  
Following Johnston (1999), in the LIDA model we speak of emotions as feelings with 
cognitive content, such as the joy at the unexpected meeting with a friend, or the embarrassment 
at having said the wrong thing. The pain in one’s arm when scratched by a thorn is a feeling that 
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is not an emotion, because it does not typically involve any cognitive content. Thirst is typically 
a feeling but not an emotion. Though the boundary between emotions and feelings is fuzzy, the 
distinction will prove important to our coming discussion of how feelings and emotions motivate 
low-level action selection and higher-level decision making. 
Every autonomous agent must be equipped with primitive motivators, drives that 
motivate its selection of actions. In humans, in animals, and in the LIDA model, these drives are 
implemented by feelings (Franklin & Ramamurthy, 2006). Such feelings implicitly give rise to 
values that serve to motivate action selection. Douglas Watt (1998, p. 114) describes well the 
pervasive role of affect, including feelings, hypothesized by the LIDA model, as seen from the 
perspective of human neuroscience:  
Taken as a whole, affect seems best conceptualized as a highly composite product of 
distributed neural systems that together globally organize the representation of value. As 
such, it probably functions as a master system of reference in the brain, integrating 
encodings done by the more modular systems supported in various relatively discrete 
thalamocortical connectivities. Given the central organizing nature of affect as a system 
for the global representation of value, and given evidence that virtually all stimuli elicit 
some degree of affective “valence tagging,” it would be hard to overestimate the 
importance of this valence tagging for all kinds of basic operations. The centrality of 
affective functions is underlined by the intrinsic interpenetration of affect, attentional 
function, and executive function, and it certainly makes sense that these three global state 
functions would be highly interdependent. It is logically impossible to separate 
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representation of value from any neural mechanisms that would define attentional foci or 
that would organize behavioral output.  
Watt’s emphasis on “representation of value” and “valence” will be important later for 
our discussion of the role emotions play in moral decision making. This section will be devoted 
to an explication of how feelings are represented in the LIDA model, the role they play in 
attention, and how they act as motivators, implicitly implementing values. (Feelings also act as 
modulators to learning, as we describe below.) Referring back to the LIDA cognitive cycle 
diagram in Fig. 1 may prove helpful to the reader. 
Every feeling has a valence, positive or negative. Also, each feeling must have its own 
identity; we distinguish between the pains of a pinprick, a burn, or an insult, and we distinguish 
pains from other unpleasant feelings, such as nausea. From a computational perspective it makes 
sense to represent the valence of a single feeling as either positive or negative, that is, as greater 
or less than zero, even though it may be simplistic to assume that the positive and negative sides 
of this scale are commensurable. Nevertheless, it may be a viable working hypothesis that in 
biological creatures feelings typically have only positive valence or negative valence (Heilman, 
1997). For example, the feeling of distress at having to over-extend holding one’s breath at the 
end of a deep dive is a different feeling from the relief that ensues with the taking of that first 
breath. Such distress is implemented with varying degrees of negative valence, and the relief 
with varying positive valence. Each has its own identity. For complex experiences, multiple 
feelings with different valences may be present simultaneously, for example, the simultaneous 
fear and exhilaration experienced while on a roller coaster. 
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Feelings are represented in the LIDA model as nodes in its perceptual memory (Slipnet). 
Each node constitutes its own very specific identity; for example, distress at not having enough 
oxygen is represented by one node, relief at taking a breath by another. Each feeling node has its 
own valence, always positive or always negative, with varying degrees. The current activation of 
the node measures the momentary value of the valence, that is, how positive or how negative. 
Though feelings are subjected to perceptual learning, their base-level activation would soon 
become saturated and change very little. Those feeling nodes with sufficient total activations, 
along with their incoming links and object nodes, become part of the current percept and are 
passed to the workspace. 
Like other workspace structures, feeling nodes help to cue transient and declarative 
episodic memories. The resulting local associations may also contain feeling nodes associated 
with memories of past events. These feeling nodes play a major role in assigning activation to 
coalitions of information to which they belong, helping them to compete for attention. Any 
feeling nodes that belong to the winning coalition become part of the conscious broadcast, the 
contents of consciousness. Feeling nodes in the conscious broadcast that also occur in the context 
of a scheme in procedural memory (the scheme net) add to the current activation of that scheme, 
increasing the likelihood of it instantiating a copy of itself into the action selection mechanism 
(the behavior net). It is here that feelings play their first role as implementation of motivation by 
adding to the likelihood of a particular action being selected. A feeling in the context of a scheme 
implicitly increases or decreases the value assigned to taking that scheme’s action. A feeling in 
the conscious broadcast in LIDA also plays a role in modulating the various forms of learning. 
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Up to a point, the higher the affect the greater the learning in the LIDA model. Beyond that 
point, more affect begins to interfere with learning.  
In the action selection mechanism the activation of a particular behavior scheme, and thus 
its ability to compete for selection and execution, depends on several factors. These factors 
include how well the context specified by the behavior scheme agrees with the current and very 
recently past contents of consciousness (that is, with the contextualized current situation). The 
contribution of feeling nodes to the behavior stream’s activation constitutes the environmental 
influence on action selection. As mentioned earlier, the activation of this newly arriving behavior 
also depends on the presence of feeling nodes in its context and their activation as part of the 
conscious broadcasts. Thus feelings contribute motivation for taking action to the activation of 
newly arriving behavior schemes.  
On the basis of the resulting activation values a single behavior is chosen by the action 
selection mechanism. The action ensuing from this behavior represents the agent’s current 
intention in the sense of Freeman (1999, p. 96ff), that is, what the agent intends to do next. The 
expected result of that behavior can be said to be the agent’s current goal. Note that the selection 
of this behavior was affected by its relevance to the current situation (the environment), the 
nature and degree of associated feelings (the drives), and its relation to other behaviors, some of 
these being prerequisite for the behavior.  
The selected behavior, including its feelings, is then passed to sensory-motor memory for 
execution. There the feelings modulate the execution of the action (Zhu & Thagard, 2002). 
Feelings may bias parameters of action such as speed or force. For example, an angry person 
picking up a soda may squeeze it harder than he would if he were not angry. 
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Higher-level cognitive processes and levels of control 
 
Higher-level cognitive processing in humans includes categorization, deliberation, 
volition, metacognition, reasoning, planning, problem solving, language comprehension, and 
language production. In the LIDA model such higher-level processes are distinguished by 
requiring multiple cognitive cycles for their accomplishment. In LIDA, higher-level cognitive 
processes can be implemented by one or more behavior streams,5 that is, streams of instantiated 
schemes and links from procedural memory.  
Cognitive processes have differing levels of control. Sloman distinguishes three levels 
that can be implemented by the architecture of an autonomous agent—the reactive, the 
deliberative, and the metacognitive (1999). The first of these, the reactive, is the level that is 
typically expected of many insects, that is, a relatively direct connection between incoming 
sensory data and the outgoing actions of effectors. The key point is the relatively direct 
triggering of an action once the appropriate environmental situation occurs. Though direct, such 
a connection can be almost arbitrarily intricate, requiring quite complex algorithms to implement 
in an artificial agent. The reactive level is perhaps best defined by what it is not. “What a purely 
reactive system cannot do is explicitly construct representations of alternative possible actions, 
evaluate them and choose between them, all in advance of performing them” (Sloman, 1999). 
Reactive control alone is particularly suitable for agents occupying relatively simple niches in 
reasonably stable environments, that is, for agents requiring little flexibility in their action 
                                            
5 A stream is a sequence with its order only partially specified.  
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selection. Such purely reactive agents typically require relatively few higher-level, multi-cyclic 
cognitive processes. 
On the other hand, deliberative control typically employs such higher-level cognitive 
processes as planning, scheduling, and problem solving. Such deliberative processes in humans, 
and in some other animals,6 are typically performed in an internally constructed virtual reality. 
Such deliberative information processing and decision making allows an agent to function more 
flexibly within a complicated niche in a complex, dynamic environment. An internal virtual 
reality for deliberation requires a short-term memory in which temporary structures can be 
constructed with which to try out possible actions “mentally” without actually executing them. In 
the LIDA model the workspace serves just such a function. In the earlier IDA software agent, the 
action selected during almost all cognitive cycles consisted of building or adding to some 
representational structures in the workspace during the process of some sort of deliberation. 
Structure-building codelets, the sub-processes that create such structures, modify, or compare 
them, etc., are typically implemented as internal reactive processes. Deliberation builds on 
reaction. In the LIDA model, deliberation is implemented as a collection of behavior streams, 
each behavior of which is an internal reactive process (Franklin, 2000a). According to the LIDA 
model, moral decision making will employ such processes. 
As deliberation builds on reactions, metacognition typically builds on deliberation. 
Sometimes described as “thinking about thinking,” metacognition in humans and animals (Smith 
& Washburn, 2005) involves monitoring deliberative processes, allocating cognitive resources, 
                                            
6 Deliberation has been demonstrated in apes (Mulcahy & Call, 2006) and birds (Werdenich & 
Huber, 2006), and may even be found in arachnids (Wilcox & Jackson, 2002; Tarsitano, 2006).  
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and regulating cognitive strategies (Flavell, 1979). Metacognition in LIDA will be implemented 
by a collection of appropriate behavior streams, each with its own metacognitive task. 
Metacognitive control adds yet another level of flexibility to an agent’s decision making, 
allowing it to function effectively in an even more complex and dynamically changing 
environmental niche. Metacognition can play an important role in the moral decision making of 
humans, who may reflect on the assumptions implicit in the values and procedures they apply. 
However, it would be necessary to implement a fully deliberative architecture before tackling 
metacognition for any artificial agents, including LIDA.  
Deliberation in humans often involves language. Of course metacognition and language 
have proved to be very difficult challenges for artificial intelligence. While the LIDA model 
suggests an experimental approach to the challenge posed by language and cognition, detailing 
that approach is beyond the scope of this paper. Let it suffice to say that in the conceptual LIDA 
model, language comprehension is dealt with by word nodes and appropriate links in perceptual 
memory, leading to structures in the workspace that provide the semantic content of the words. 
We believe that language generation can be accomplished by schemes in procedural memory 
whose instantiations produce words or phrases. Given the complexity that language and language 
creation introduce to the cognitive architecture, the designers of LIDA have tabled this problem 
until the comprehensive LIDA model has been fully implemented computationally.  
Volitional decision making 
Volitional decision making (volition for short) is a higher-level cognitive process for 
conscious action selection. To understand volition it must be carefully distinguished from (a) 
consciously mediated action selection, (b) automatized action selection, (c) alarms, and (d) the 
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execution of actions. Each of the latter three is performed unconsciously. Consciously planning a 
driving route from a current location to the airport is an example of deliberative, volitional 
decision making. Choosing to turn left at an appropriate intersection along the route requires 
information about the identity of the cross street acquired consciously, but the choice itself is 
most likely made unconsciously—the choice was consciously mediated even though it was 
unconsciously made. While driving along a straight road with little traffic, the necessary slight 
adjustments to the steering wheel are typically automatized actions selected completely 
unconsciously. They are usually not even consciously mediated, though unconscious sensory 
input is used in their selection. If a car cuts in front of the driver, often he or she will have turned 
the steering wheel and pressed the brake simultaneously with becoming conscious of the danger. 
An alarm mechanism has unconsciously selected appropriate actions in response to the 
challenge. The actual turning of the steering wheel, how fast, how far, the execution of the 
action, is also performed unconsciously though with very rapid sensory input.  
Though heavily influenced by the conscious broadcast (i.e., the contents of 
consciousness), action selection during a single cognitive cycle in the LIDA model is not 
performed consciously. A cognitive cycle is a mostly unconscious process. When speaking, for 
example, a person usually does not consciously think in advance about the structure and content 
of the next sentence, and is sometimes even surprised at what comes out. When approaching the 
intersection in the example above, no conscious thought need be given to the choice to turn left. 
Consciousness serves to provide information on which such action selection is based, but the 
selection itself is done unconsciously after the conscious broadcast (Negatu & Franklin, 2002). 
We refer to this very typical single cycle process as consciously mediated action selection.  
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A runner on an unobstructed sidewalk may only pay attention to it occasionally to be sure 
it remains safe. Between such moments he or she can attend to the beauty of the fall leaves or the 
music coming from the iPod. The running itself has become automatized, just as the adjustments 
to the steering wheel in the example above. In the LIDA model such automatization occurs over 
time with each stride initiating a process that unconsciously chooses the next. With childhood 
practice the likelihood of conscious mediation between each stride and the next diminishes. Such 
automatization in the LIDA model (Negatu, McCauley & Franklin, in review) is implemented 
via pandemonium theory (Jackson, 1987). 
Sloman (1998) has emphasized the need for an alarm mechanism such as that described 
in the driving example above. A neuroscientific description of an alarm entails a direct pathway, 
the “low road,” from the thalamus to the amygdala, bypassing the sensory cortices, the “high 
road,” and thereby consciousness (Das et al., 2005). The LIDA model implements alarms via 
learned perceptual memory alarm structures, bypassing the workspace and consciousness, and 
passing directly to procedural memory. There the appropriate scheme is instantiated directly into 
sensory-motor memory, bypassing action selection. This alarm mechanism runs unconsciously in 
parallel with the current, partly conscious, cognitive cycle.  
The modes of action selection discussed above operate over different time scales. 
Volition may take seconds, or even much, much longer. Consciously mediated actions are 
selected roughly five to ten times every second, and automatized actions as fast as that, or faster. 
Alarm mechanisms seem to operate in the sub 50 ms range. In contrast, the execution of an 
action requires sensory motor communication at roughly 40 times a second, all done 
subconsciously (Goodale & Milner, 2004). The possibility of hitting a 90 mph fastball coming 
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over the plate, or of returning a 140 mph tennis serve, makes the need for such sensory motor 
rates believable. 
We now return to a consideration of deliberative, volitional decision making, having 
distinguished it from other modes of action selection and execution. In 1890, William James 
introduced his ideomotor theory of volition (1890). James uses an example of getting out of bed 
on a cold winter morning to effectively illustrate his theory, but in this age of heated homes we 
will use thirst as an example. James postulated proposers, objectors, and supporters as actors in 
the drama of acting volitionally. He might have suggested the following scenario in the context 
of dealing with a feeling of thirst. The idea of drinking orange juice “pops into mind,” propelled 
to consciousness by a proposer motivated by a feeling of thirst and a liking for orange juice. “No, 
it’s too sweet,” asserts an objector. “How about a beer?” says a different proposer. “Too early in 
the day,” says another objector. “Orange juice is more nutritious,” says a supporter. With no 
further objections, drinking orange juice is volitionally selected.  
Baars incorporated ideomotor theory directly into his global workspace theory (1988, 
Chapter 7). The LIDA model fleshes out volitional decision making via ideomotor theory within 
global workspace theory (Franklin, 2000b) as follows. An idea “popping into mind” in the LIDA 
model is accomplished by the idea being part of the conscious broadcast of a cognitive cycle, 
that is, part of the contents of consciousness for that cognitive moment. These contents are the 
information contained within the winning coalition for that cycle. This winning coalition was 
gathered by some attention codelet. Ultimately, this attention codelet is responsible for the idea 
“popping into mind.” Thus we implemented the characters in James’ scenario as attention 
codelets, with some acting as proposers, others as objectors, and others as supporters. In the 
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presence of a thirst node in the workspace, one such attention codelet, a proposer codelet, wants 
to bring drinking orange juice to mind, that is, to consciousness. Seeing a let’s-drink-orange-
juice node in the workspace, another attention codelet, an objector codelet, wants to bring to 
mind the idea that orange juice is too sweet. Supporter codelets are implemented similarly.  
But, how does the conscious thought of “let’s drink orange juice” lead to a let’s-drink-
orange-juice node in the workspace? Like every higher-order cognitive process in the LIDA 
model, volition occurs over multiple cycles, and is implemented by a behavior stream in the 
action selection module. This volitional behavior stream is an instantiation of a volitional scheme 
in procedural memory. Whenever a proposal node in its context is activated by a proposal in the 
conscious broadcast, this volitional scheme instantiates itself. The instantiated volitional scheme, 
the volitional behavior stream, is incorporated into the action selection mechanism, the behavior 
net. The first behavior in this volitional behavior stream sets up the deliberative process of 
volitional decision making as specified by ideomotor theory, including writing the let’s-drink-
orange-juice node to the workspace.7 
Our fleshing out of ideomotor theory in the LIDA model includes the addition of a 
timekeeper codelet, created by the first behavior in the volitional behavior stream. The 
timekeeper starts its timer running as a consequence of a proposal coming to mind. When the 
timer runs down, the action of the proposal contends in the behavior net to be the next selected 
                                            
7 Alternatively, this node could arrive in the workspace with the percept of the following cycle as 
a result of internal sensing of the internal speech. In LIDA, this is only an implementation 
matter, making no functional difference. In humans this is an empirical matter to be decided by 
experiment. Thus the design decision for LIDA becomes a cognitive hypothesis. 
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action, with the weight (activation) of deliberation supporting it. The proposal is most likely to 
be selected barring an objection or an intervening crisis. The appearance of an objection in 
consciousness stops and resets the timer, while that of a supporter or another proposal restarts the 
timer from a new beginning. Note that a single proposal with no objection can be quickly 
accepted and acted upon. 
But, might this volitional decision-making process not oscillate with continuing cycles of 
proposing and objecting as in Eric Berne’s “what if” game (1964)? Indeed it might. The LIDA 
model includes three means of reducing this likelihood. The activation of a proposer codelet is 
reduced each time it succeeds in coming to consciousness, thus decreasing the likelihood of its 
winning during a subsequent cognitive cycle. The same is true of objector and supporter 
codelets. The LIDA model hypothesizes that supporting arguments help in decision making in 
part by giving the supported proposal more time in consciousness, allowing more time off the 
timer. As a second means of preventing oscillation, impatience is built into the timekeeper 
codelet. Each restart of the timer is for a little less time, thus making a decision easier to reach. 
Finally, a metacognitive process can watch over the whole volitional procedure, eventually 
decide that it has gone on long enough, and simply choose an alternative. This latter process has 
not yet been implemented. 
 
LIDA in comparison to other cognitive architectures 
 
Competing theories within the cognitive and neuro- sciences suggest different approaches 
to understanding specific human mental faculties. In describing how the LIDA model handles 
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various tasks, we do not mean to suggest that other approaches are incorrect. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the competing theories or approaches. The LIDA model 
attempts to formulate an approach to AGI that accommodates a significant portion of what is 
known about human functioning through the work of cognitive scientists and neuroscientists. It 
is possible that researchers will eventually demonstrate that GWT, upon which the LIDA model 
has been built, is inadequate for understanding human cognition.  
LIDA differs from most other cognitive architectures in several significant ways. Here’s 
a short, selective, but certainly non-exhaustive list. 
Most cognitive architectures are either symbolic or connectionist, though some 
incorporate aspects of both, for example, Clarion (Sun, 2007) and ACT-R (Anderson, 1990). 
Strictly speaking, LIDA is neither. Though LIDA’s internal representations are mostly composed 
of nodes and links, the nodes are not symbolic, that is, amodal. Rather, they should be thought of 
as perceptual symbols or perceptual symbol generators in the sense of Barsalou (1999). Also, 
passing activation occurs throughout the LIDA architecture, but none of it is quite in the mode of 
artificial neural networks. For example, major modes of learning in LIDA are not performed by 
changing weights on links. Rather, in instructionist learning, new representations are added 
appropriate to the particular mode: nodes and links to perceptual associative memory, Boolean 
vectors to transient episodic memory, or schemes to procedural memory. In selectionist learning 
the base-level activations of old representations are boosted or diminished. 
Following GWT, the LIDA architecture incorporates a specific attention mechanism that 
selects the most salient, e.g., important, urgent, insistent, portion of its understanding of its 
current situation for broadcast to all of the modules of the architecture. This broadcast serves 
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both to recruit possible appropriate response actions, and to effect several modes of learning. 
Other than the much less comprehensive models of Shanahan (2006) and Dehaene’s also much 
less comprehensive neural network model (Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003), LIDA is the 
only such cognitive architecture. 
Many of the other general cognitive architectures mentioned above incorporate some 
form of learning. However, LIDA is unique, to our knowledge, in enabling four distinct modes 
of learning, perceptual, episodic, procedural, and attentional, each modeled after the 
corresponding mode of human learning. Each mode is human-like in the sense that the learning 
is unsupervised, continual, and both selectionist and instructionalist. 
Every cognitive architecture must operate via an iteration of sense-cognize-act cycles.8 
The LIDA architecture is unique in distinguishing low-level, single cognitive cycle action 
selection from higher-level multi-cyclic decision making. LIDA’s cognitive cycle, hypothesized 
to occur at a 10hz rate in humans, can be thought of as a cognitive atom or moment, from 
sequences of which higher-level cognitive processes can be implemented in a consistent fashion. 
Though there has been much research on artificial feelings and emotions (e.g., Canamero, 
2003; Gadanho, 2003), to our knowledge LIDA is the only comprehensive cognitive architecture 
to incorporate feelings and emotions as its sole implementation of motivations for action 
selection, as well as for modulators of learning (Franklin & Ramamurthy, 2006). 
 
                                            
8 This does not mean that these cycles need be in strict serial order. Many of the processes within 
a cycle can operate in parallel. And, the cycles can overlap or cascade. In the LIDA model only 
the conscious broadcast and the action selection must occur in serial order. 
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Processing moral considerations within the LIDA model 
 
Bottom-up propensities, values, and learning 
 
Complex moral faculties involve reflection about and modification of the bottom-up 
propensities embodied in emotional/affective responses to actions and their outcomes. Bottom-
up propensities in the form of feelings and inherent values influence morality but they are not 
necessarily reflective of the values a society would recognize as moral values. Negative feelings 
may, for example, lead to prejudices by automatically attaching to entities that are not a part of 
the agent’s immediate group. From a moral perspective, it is important to understand how top-
down considerations interact with these bottom-up propensities reinforcing “good” ones and 
defusing if not actually eliminating “bad” ones. The approach LIDA offers to the challenge of 
implementing this hybrid system begins with the way an agent captures bottom-up propensities 
and the values implicit in these propensities.  
Associations between objects, people, contexts, actions, situations, etc. and specific 
feelings and their valences (positive or negative) are the primary way values and bottom-up 
propensities form in an agent’s mind. The values are implicit in the feelings and their valences, 
and LIDA captures this dynamic. These associations may arise during perception where sensory 
input is connected to nodes (objects, feelings, ideas, categories, actions) in perceptual memory. 
These nodes in turn activate and connect to information retrieved from the various memory 
systems, which in LIDA are represented as separate memory modules.  
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Feelings and perceptions that arise within the same LIDA cycle may form associations, 
particularly when the affective input is strong. But unless the sensory input is particularly strong 
and sustained, or the initial input cues associated memories, the perception of the objects and 
situations, and their associated affects, decay quickly and disappear. 
The strength of a value, the strength of the connection between feeling and object or 
situation, is reinforced by sustained sensory input, but these values are short-lived unless the 
information comes to attention. Attention reinforces a connection for the longer term through 
perceptual and episodic learning. Powerful memories, that is, memories linked to strong 
valences, are reinforced each time they come to attention.  
LIDA’s perceptual memory (a part of long-term memory) is implemented by a Slipnet, a 
network of nodes, and links between the nodes, that represent structures and concepts. Features, 
objects, and valenced feelings can be nodes, and links between these nodes represent 
relationships that can form more complex structures (percepts). These percepts pass on to the 
system’s working memory9 (workspace) from which they cue associated information in other 
areas of short- and long-term memory, and this information in turn leads to further associations 
that may enrich or alter the percepts.  
Particularly difficult challenges for LIDA, similar to those encountered by any human-
like computer architecture, are how sensory input leads to the activation of nodes in the Slipnet 
and how new nodes can be created to represent new phenomena. In principle, individual 
                                            
9 Working memory, in the way psychologists use the term (Baddeley, 1992), includes 
consciousness. In the LIDA model, working memory (the workspace) is preconscious in each 
cognitive cycle. 
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subroutines or codelets can search for specific sensory input, process that information, and pass it 
on to the activation of a node. Or, similarly, a neural network might organize sensory input. But 
using current computational technology it becomes difficult to scale either of these approaches to 
manage a broad array of inputs and nodes.  
In addition, there is the difficult problem of determining how to represent valences in the 
Slipnet. Must they be represented as somatic feelings or is it adequate to use a cognitive 
representation of the valence. If the feeling is expunged of any somatic affect, and serves merely 
as a symbol or mathematical formula representing the positive or negative feeling, will it carry 
the full import of the feeling as it is factored into the selection of an action?  
These are not easy problems, but LIDA does offer an architecture for integrating 
presently available solutions. Given the modularity of LIDA, it will also be able to integrate 
more sophisticated solutions to these challenges as they emerge from laboratories focusing on 
the development of specific hardware and software tools.  
 
Moral deliberation involving rules 
 
In almost all situations our action selection decisions, including those that could be said 
to involve morals, are made in a bottom-up fashion during a single cognitive cycle as described 
above. Much more rarely, but still with some frequency, our moral decisions are more complex 
and require some thought, that is, deliberation. Such a situation might occur when we are faced 
with a moral dilemma. This often leads to conflicting voices in our heads, some of which might 
frame their arguments in terms of rules, for example, “thou shalt not kill.” Let us consider how 
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such rules are represented in the LIDA model. What activates a rule and brings it to conscious 
attention? How might some rules be automated to form rules-of-thumb?  
A specific example of an inner dialogue about a moral dilemma may help. Suppose the 
company you work for licenses some new, expensive computer software, say Adobe’s 
Photoshop. After becoming comfortable with the new software package at work, you feel the 
urge to copy it onto your home computer. An internal dialog commences, but not necessarily as 
wholly verbal and grammatical as what follows. “Let’s bring Photoshop home and load the 
program on my Mac.” “You shouldn’t do that. That would be illegal and stealing.” “But I’d use 
it for work related projects that benefit my company, which owns the software.” “Yes, but you’d 
also use it for personal projects with no relation to the company.” “True, but most of the work 
would be company related.” Etc., etc., etc. 
In such a case, one’s decision making is happening consciously, volitionally. The LIDA 
model describes the handling of such a situation by means of a higher order, multi-cyclic, 
deliberative process. This conscious, volitional process was described earlier in the section titled 
Volitional decision making. Recall that the internal players included proposers, objectors, 
supporters, and a timekeeper. Each of the first three players is implemented in the model by an 
attention codelet that brings ideas to consciousness.  
In our example, a proposer, winning the competition for consciousness, causes the idea of 
copying Photoshop to the home Mac to “pop into mind.” This proposal in consciousness impels 
the instantiation of a deliberation scheme whose first action, the birth of the timekeeper, the 
starting of the timer and the writing of the proposal node to the workspace, is selected as the 
action of the current cycle. In a subsequent cycle that follows soon after, an objector succeeds in 
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bringing to consciousness the idea of “no that would be stealing.” The action selected in this 
cycle would be to stop and reset the timer. A supporter brings the next idea to consciousness, the 
timer is restarted, and the process continues over the succeeding cognitive cycles. The game is 
afoot.  
Note that the first objector implicitly based its objection on the rule “thou shalt not steal.” 
To describe how and where this moral dictum is represented in the LIDA model, and how it 
plays its role, we begin at the end of the proposal cycle with the proposal structure (“let’s copy 
Photoshop”) in the workspace. There, because of a prior semantic association between copying 
and stealing, it cues the rule “thou shalt not steal” from semantic memory, a part of declarative 
memory (Franklin et al., 2005). The rule is represented as a structure in the workspace, that is, as 
a collection of nodes and links from perceptual memory, the common currency for information 
in the LIDA model (Franklin, 2005a). An objector attention codelet then forms a coalition whose 
informational content is “don’t copy Photoshop; that would be stealing.” This objection coming 
to consciousness and stopping the timer constitutes the rule playing its role in moral decision 
making.  
Rules and duties are stored in semantic memory as perceptual structures. Cued by a 
proposal or an objection the rule is recalled into working memory as a local association and 
brought to consciousness to participate in the internal dialogue. Note that a supporter, as well as 
an objector, can invoke a rule. The dialogue stops when a proposal is on the table without further 
objection long enough for the timer to ding. At that point a scheme in procedural memory that 
knows how to act on the proposal is instantiated into the action selection mechanism with a high 
activation. Thus its selection is assured barring some crisis or other alarm.  
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But sometimes this kind of top-down, rule-based decision making can shift to a bottom-
up, affect-based action selection. Each time an application of a rule or duty comes to 
consciousness it, like every conscious event, becomes subject to perceptual learning. If a 
particular rule is applied frequently in similar situations, LIDA may produce a category node in 
perceptual memory, representing that rule in an abstract version of the similar situations. In our 
example, our moral decision-making agent might learn the abstract node “don’t copy software if 
you don’t have a license for it.” If such a node is reinforced often enough this application of the 
rule is automatic. During the extended learning process the node would acquire links to other 
nodes, particularly to feelings with negative valence. Thus when faced with a situation where 
copying software might be tempting, this rule node can become part of the percept. Its presence 
in the workspace would then inhibit proposer codelets from proposing copying software, that is, 
by invoking the rule automatically.  
Why does the internal dialogue begin? We have seen how it begins. It begins with a 
proposer-attention codelet bringing a proposal into mind, into the global workspace, that is 
“popping it into mind.” But, why isn’t the action, copying the software for example, simply 
selected as the consciously mediated action at the end of a single cycle, with no dialogue at all? 
In some specific situations copying software is permissible. The software license may allow 
installation on two machines, office and home, for use by a single user. If encountered frequently 
enough, a scheme for copying software can be procedurally learned with this situation as its 
context. In such a case, copying software can become a consciously mediated action that is 
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selected during a single cycle.10 But, in order for such a scheme to be procedurally learned, its 
action must have been selected volitionally at least once; that is, some deliberative process must 
have allowed it.  
Generally it is the perceived novelty of a given situation that leads to it being the subject 
of deliberation, rather than simply selected. It is the newness, or at least apparent newness, of a 
situation that in effect demands that the agent think about it. New situations do not fit neatly into 
innate or learned heuristics, and therefore these situations demand attention. In attending to new 
circumstances, associated proposals and objections naturally come to mind. 
 
The implementation of planning and imagination  
 
Moral decision making in humans often involves the planning of various possible 
scenarios and the testing of them in our imagination. Imagination entails the creation of mental 
images of objects, actions, situations that are not necessarily current in the outside world. The 
material for this personal mental realm derives from present and past perceptions of the outside 
material world and may include some imaginary elements or revisions to existing elements. 
The testing of multiple scenarios will, of course, require many cognitive cycles. Some 
cycles may be devoted to examining an internal scenario while others may entail actions 
performed on or with external objects. As an example, consider an architect who has been given 
                                            
10 The actual process is a little more complex. A behavior stream whose behaviors result in 
copying software would be instantiated into LIDA’s action selection mechanism and the first 
behavior in that stream likely would be selected. 
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the task of designing a house for a wooded lot while saving as many trees as possible. Part of the 
architect’s training would have involved learning complex internal behavior streams for 
constructing and manipulating scenarios by placing various rooms at particular locations. Other 
internal behavior streams would allow the evaluation of such scenarios (mental floor plans on the 
lot) using functional, aesthetic, and moral criteria. Volitional decision making, as described 
above, would employ yet other behavior streams to decide which of the constructed scenarios to 
select. Appropriately, in LIDA, the central site for much of this work is the workspace, though an 
embodied LIDA-based robot might also put ideas on paper. This evaluation of possible scenarios 
could be accomplished without actually cutting down a single tree, and before drawing any 
building plan. Deliberation will have done its job. 
As we have seen previously, each agent that is controlled by LIDA’s architecture, 
including we humans (presuming that LIDA captures the way we function), will understand its 
environment by means of a model built in the workspace by structure-building codelets. The 
components of which this internal model of the world is built are nodes and links from 
perceptual memory, the common currency of the LIDA architecture (Barsalou, 1999). The 
agent’s internal representation serves to model both the agent’s external environment and its 
internal environment. We hypothesize this internal representation in the workspace as the site of 
the structures that enables imagination including deliberation on multiple scenarios.  
These internal deliberative structures are built in the workspace using, among other 
things, material written there over multiple cognitive cycles by behaviors selected at the end of a 
cognitive cycle whose actions are internal, that is, actions that effect changes within the agent 
itself, rather than on the outside world. The results of such internal actions may be perceived by 
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the agent through its internal senses, or may be written directly to the workspace, and may also 
in turn be externalized when, for example, the architect adds a new element to a drawing of the 
building. All of these possibilities occur in humans. 
Ultimately, for moral deliberation to be appropriately modeled by LIDA, attention 
codelets that are sensitive to morally relevant information will need to be designed. Whether the 
design of such morally sensitive codelets differs from the general design of codelets that search 
for concrete information remains to be seen. But minimally, for example, we expect that 
attention codelets that are sensitive to concrete information about the facial and vocal 
expressions of people affected by an AMA’s actions will need to be part of the mix. The 
advantage of codelets is that they provide an indefinitely extensible framework for taking more 
and more of the relevant factors into account. 
The selected internal behaviors that contribute to a deliberation are organized into 
behavior streams that serve to implement the deliberative process at hand. Such deliberative 
behavior streams would typically be a product of procedural learning. In our architect’s save-the-
trees example, a complex behavior stream with behaviors to construct a scenario placing various 
rooms at particular locations would have been learned. Another internal behavior stream would 
allow the evaluation of such scenarios (mental or drawn floor plans on the lot) using functional, 
aesthetic, and moral criteria. Volitional decision making, as described above, would employ yet 
another behavior stream to decide which of the constructed scenarios to select. Appropriately, 
the central site for much of this work is the workspace, sometimes complemented by those 
elements of the deliberation that have been concretized into external forms such as the architect’s 
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drawing, a mathematical formula, a painting, or a list of criteria on which the scenario should be 
evaluated.  
As described in the section above on Higher-level cognitive processes and levels of 
control, metacognition in the LIDA model involves the use of deliberation in much the same way 
as the kind of planning we have just described. Metaethical reflections would be a special case of 
such metacognition, when the issue at hand was the efficacy or appropriateness of a moral rule or 
criterion. As mentioned above, we introspectively presume that language and inner voices are 
central to metaethical reflections. However, the fleshing out of metacognition and metaethics is 
far beyond the scope of this article, and beyond anything that has been implemented in the LIDA 
model to date.  
 
Resolution, evaluation, and further learning 
 
A LIDA-based agent would reach a resolution to a volitional decision when there 
is no longer an objection to a proposal. Given that the activation of an objection decays in 
repeat cycles, strongly activated proposals will in time prevail over weak objections. 
However, attention codelets responsible for proposals and their supporters also weaken in 
their activation as they succeed in coming into consciousness during multiple cycles. 
Weak proposals may also lose the competition for attention to other concerns demanding 
attention, defusing any pressure or need for the agent to act on the challenge. Highly 
activated rules, duties, or other objectors will outlast weak proposers, and force the 
development of more creative proposals that accommodate the strong objections.  
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However, time pressures may force a decision before all objections have been 
dispelled. Decay in the strength of proposals and objections, time pressures on decision 
making, and pressures from other concerns can drive the selection of a response to a 
challenge even when the response is inadequate or incomplete. Two mechanisms 
facilitate dealing with time pressures in the LIDA model. An attention codelet noting the 
time frame within which the decision must be made would actually increase its activation 
as the deadline neared. The second mechanism is the timekeeper, discussed above, which 
manages the volitional decision-making process. Recall that impatience is built into the 
timekeeper. Each restart of the timer is for less time, making a decision easier to reach. 
An attention codelet reminding of an approaching deadline accelerates this process by 
continually reducing the time on the timer cycle by cycle. 
Furthermore, moral deliberations seldom vanquish all objections even with a 
generous allocation of time. Moral decisions are often messy, but the LIDA architecture 
has the means to produce adaptive behavior despite the complexity. Furthermore, future 
LIDA-inspired moral agents may consider a broader array of proposals, objections, and 
supporting evidence than a human agent can, and thereby, perhaps, select a more 
satisfactory course of action than many humans. 
A LIDA agent, like a human agent, may well be highly susceptible to acting upon 
strongly reinforced impulses and proposals without necessarily considering the needs of 
others. That is, the LIDA model in and of itself is morally neutral. What LIDA does offer 
is a model for computer learning that could provide steps towards a more complete model 
of moral education.  
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The manner in which a LIDA-based artificial moral agent monitors its actions will 
be important to its moral development. When a resolution to a moral challenge has been 
determined, such an agent monitors the success of the resulting actions as it would any 
other action, primarily by means of an expectation codelet. An expectation codelet is an 
attention codelet that is spawned simultaneously with the selected action. The job of this 
expectation codelet is to bring to consciousness information about the outcome of the 
action. In particular, the expectation codelet would become strongly activated by 
discrepancies between the predicted result of a course of action and its actual result. 
Attention to this discrepancy will in turn reinforce or inhibit the application of that 
behavior to future similar challenges. In this manner, attention to how the result 
correlates with the prediction contributes to procedural learning. This general model of 
procedural learning is applicable to moral development in the context of an agent that has 
explicitly factored moral considerations into the selection of an action, and into its 
expectations about the positive moral outcome of the selected action.  
 
Moving forward 
 
In this paper we have sought to demonstrate how moral decision making builds upon 
mechanisms used for the other forms of cognition. LIDA provides one comprehensive model 
through which to consider the many mechanisms that contribute to the ability to make a moral 
judgment. Furthermore, we have offered some hypotheses as to how these mechanisms might 
work together. 
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The value of a comprehensive theory, such as the GWT/LIDA model, is that it provides a 
framework for integrating input from a wide variety of sources. A modular system, such as 
LIDA, can support a broad range of inputs. Modular computer systems do not depend entirely on 
the ingenuity of one design team. The designers of comprehensive systems can draw on the best-
of-breed in the selection of modules developed by other researchers for managing sensory input, 
perception, or various forms of memory including semantic memory and procedural memory. 
For example, if a better model than sparse distributed memory became available for transient 
episodic memory, and that model had been implemented computationally, the new module could 
be integrated into a LIDA agent instead. The one proviso would be that the output from that 
module and input to that module could be structured to work with the perceptual nodes in the 
Slipnet, LIDA’s common currency.  
In the GWT/LIDA model, competition for consciousness between different coalitions, 
global broadcasting of the winning coalition, and the selection of an action in each cycle can be 
thought of as the mechanisms for integrating the input from the various sources. The 
unconscious parallel processing of information, the speed of the cycles, and the multi-cyclic 
approach to higher-order cognitive faculties holds out the promise that a LIDA-like moral agent 
could integrate a wide array of morally relevant inputs into its choices and actions. 
Nevertheless, we do not want to give the impression that AI projects such as LIDA can 
solve all problems. LIDA, like other AI procedures for choosing actions and testing scenarios, 
has the problem of scaling—that is, a problem of whether its strategy can be adapted to handle 
the building and evaluation of complex scenarios. Furthermore, the discussion above raises a 
host of additional questions. Do the mechanisms suggested by these descriptions capture 
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important aspects of the human decision-making process? Even if humans function differently, 
are the mechanisms described adequate to capture the practical demands of moral decision 
making? Are the mechanisms for representing the conflict between different rules (proposers and 
objectors) too simplistic to capture the rich dynamics of human moral decision making? Is the 
functional model of consciousness suggested by GWT and the LIDA model adequate? Or, will 
the agent require some form of phenomenal experience that is not captured in the system 
described? Can morality really be understood without a full description of its social aspects? 
How well would LIDA handle the kinds of delicate social negotiations that are involved in 
managing and regulating the conflicts that arise among agents with competing interests? 
While we, and others working with the model, are able to suggest ways that LIDA could 
meet these challenges, initially these approaches will be only theories with no proof of concept. 
For example, we are aware that LIDA will need something like a Theory of Mind (ToM) to 
function adequately within social contexts, and are working through ways that the model might 
be adapted to accommodate an appreciation of other’s beliefs and intents. We believe that it may 
be possible to build a ToM into the model using its existing modules and processes (Friedlander 
& Franklin, 2008), but as of this writing there is no ToM in LIDA. Certainly the structure-
building and attention codelets sensitive to the emotional expressions on people’s faces that were 
mentioned earlier would be an aspect of building a ToM into LIDA. 
Of course, many will remain suspicious of mechanical explanations of moral faculties. 
But the proof, as has been often said, will be in the pudding. What has been described above is 
certainly not a demonstration that fully functioning AMAs will emerge from computational 
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systems. Rather, we have outlined one rich experimental framework for exploring this 
possibility.  
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Figure Captions 
Fig. 1. LIDA cognitive cycle diagram. 
 
